Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

State of Utah v. Paul Serge Burningham : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. Bruce Oliver; Attorney for Deffendant.
Steven Neil Mercer; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; E. Neal Gunnarson; Salt Lake District
Attorney; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Burningham, No. 960656 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/474

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee,
Case No. 960656-CA
vs,
PAUL SERGE BURNINGHAM,
Defendant, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE and CROSS-APPELLANT
Appeal from the final Order of Dismissal
with prejudice from the Honorable Leon A. Dever
of the Third Judicial District Court, Division II
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

D. Bruce Oliver (5120)
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C.
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
Attorney for Defendant, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant
Steven Neil Mercer (6931)
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street, Suite S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee,
Case No. 960656-CA
vs,
PAUL SERGE BURNINGHAM,
Defendant, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE and CROSS-APPELLANT
Appeal from the final Order of Dismissal
with prejudice from the Honorable Leon A. Dever
of the Third Judicial District Court, Division II
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah

D. Bruce Oliver (5120)
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C.
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
Attorney for Defendant, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant
Steven Neil Mercer (6931)
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street, Suite S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pages
Table of Authorities

•

Statement of Jurisdiction

ii
1

Statement of Issues

1-2

Standards of Review

2-3

Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions
Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case:

II.

Course of the Proceedings:

3
3-5
3
3-4

III. Disposition in Trial Court:

4

IV.

5

Statement of Facts:

Summary of the Argument
Argument

5-6
6-15

Preface

6-7

Point I. — The "Dismissal-with-Prejudice"
Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Point II. — The Practicing Law Without a License
Prohibited Statute is Overbroad and Therefore
Violates the Utah State Constitution
Conclusion

7-11

11-15
15-16

Certificate of Mailing

17

Addenda

18

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Utah
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

Constitution Article 1/ Section 12
25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGES

Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports,
Inc. , 740- P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987)
Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Leigh, 912 P.2d 452 (Utah

2

App. 1996)

7

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)
Utah D.O.T. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995). . .

6-7
2

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996)

1

RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 11

3, 15

Utah R. Civ. P. 41

3, 5
12-15
3, 5

Utah R. Civ. P. 81

12, 15
Utah R. Crim. P. 16

3, 10-11

Utah R. Crim. P. 25

3, 9-11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const, art. I, § 12

3

ii

Bruce Oliver #5120
M^tomey fox defendant, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: ffion 595-moo

3 1 I !"III'. .IT ' II .'01 IK'!' OI'" ' APPEALS

,1,'I'AT! , I Il« U T A H ,

Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee,
Case No. 960656-CA
vgi

PAUL SERGE BURNINGHAM,
Defendant, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

STATEMENT <j£ .^JURISDICTION
•J i i i sdi ciiori is conferred e^ ^ i s Court by Utah Code
Ann.

§ 78-2a-J (1996) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in

criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first
degree or capital felony)
judgmen^
- q-

Appellant appeal

in ssa 1 w i I

seconc '-

:; - :

iving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Driving on a

Suspended License, and Faulty Equipment and the latent filing of
an appeal from the Appellant's original «voluntary dismissal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the tri al court abused its discretion to

dismiss with prejudice in light of prosecutorial misconduct?
(2) Whether the trial court should have awarded
attorney fees and costs to Defendant?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1) - (2) The trial court did not abuse its discretion
to dismiss this matter "with prejudice."
In Maxfield l"v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975)], the
Utah Supreme court affirmed a trial court's dismissal with
prejudice against the plaintiff for "inexcusable neglect in
failing to prepare and prosecute her claim with reasonable
diligence." Id. at 1324-25. In the instant case, the trial
court provided plaintiffs "an opportunity to be heard and to
do justice." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). Plaintiffs
nevertheless abused their opportunity through dilatory
conduct.
We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the
trial court's order denying plaintiffs1 motion to set aside
the dismissal. Costs to defendants.
Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports, Inc, 740 P.2d
1368, 1371 (Utah App. 1987).
(2) The trial court should have awarded attorney fees
and costs to the Appellee.
The choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily
the responsibility of the trial judge and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257,
1266 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted); see also Arnica Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). "Because trial courts must deal first hand with the
parties and the discovery process, they are given broad
discretion regarding the imposition of discovery sanctions."
Darrinqton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
see also Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584,
585 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990); 8A
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2291 (1994) (discussing the federal rule).
Utah D.O.T. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995).
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STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. 11
Utah R. Crim P. 16
Utah R. Civ. P. 41

Utah R. Crim. P. 25
Utah R. Civ. P. 81
Utah Const, art. I, § 12
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from the second dismissal "with

prejudice" of charges filed against Mr. Burningham after the
first information was voluntarily dismissed on motion by the
State.

Said Motion was filed in light of the State's failure to

provide a video tape by way of discovery and court order to
provide the tape in five days.
II.

Course of the Proceedings:
This case went through two trial courts without a

trial.

This matter was first filed in the Third Circuit Court of

Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department and the matter was
assigned to the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer under case no.
955017625TC. (R. at 1-3). The State voluntarily motioned for a
dismissal and the Court granted same based on the premise that
the State was unable to provide the defense, within five days,
the video tape as ordered by Judge Palmer.

(R. at 114-16).

Then the State refiled, (r. at 4-6), in the Third
Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department and
assigned to the Honorable Leon A. Dever under case no.
955039908TC.

Judge Dever dismissed this matter by interpreting

the prior dismissal as "with prejudice" in light of the fact that
the State's motion to dismiss was after the expiration of the
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five day limitation to provide the video tape to the defense.
(R. at 69-73).
III. Disposition in Trial Court:
Judge Dever ordered this matter dismissed with
prejudice and denied Mr. Burningham!s request for attorney fees.
IV.

Statement of Facts;
Charges were filed under case no. 955017625TC against

Mr. Burningham on May 30, 1995. (R. at 1-3). The Honorable
Phillip K. Palmer was assigned to the case. Mr. Burningham
requested discovery and the State responded.

On September 29,

1995 the trial court held a pre-trial conference.

At the pre-

trial, the defense indicated that Mr. Burninghara was not provided
a copy of the video tape identified by the prosecution when the
State responded to the discovery request.

Judge Palmer granted

the defense a continuance in order for the State to provide the
defense with the video tape. At the next pre-trial conference on
October 23, 1995, the State still did not provide the defense
with the video tape and Judge Palmer ordered the State to provide
the tape within five days.

Instead of providing the video tape

by October 28, 1995, the State voluntarily motioned for a
dismissal on October 30, 1995. The State motioned to dismiss
this matter on the basis the State was unable to provide the
defense with the video tape as ordered by Judge Palmer.
114-16).

(R. at

On the same date, the trial court granted the order of

dismissal.
Then, the State refiled the charges against Mr.
Burningham, (r. at 4-6), and issued another warrant for his
arrest, (R. at 7), on November 29, 1995. Additionally, a notice
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of (second) arraignment was mailed to Mr. Burningham on December
4, 1995 notifying Mr. Burningham of an arraignment on December
28, 1995. (R. at 8). After Mr. Burningham pled Not Guilty—
again, he rehired D. Bruce Oliver to represent him and Mr. Oliver
re-entered his appearance and re-requested discovery on February
22, 1996. (R. at 12-19).

On March 5, 1996, the State responded

to discovery, minus the video tape again. (R. at 21-22).
However, the State supplemented its discovery and finally
provided the September 1995 requested and October 23, 1995
ordered tape on April 3, 1996. (R. at 23-24).
Based on the foregoing prosecutorial failure and facts,
on August 2, 1996, Judge Dever dismissed this matter interpreting
the prior dismissal as "with prejudice" in light of the fact that
the State!s motion to dismiss was after the expiration of the
five day limitation to provide the video tape to the defense.
(R. at 69-73).

Contemporaneously, Judge Dever denied Mr.

Burningham1s request for costs.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judges in this matter abused no discretion by
dismissing either cases.

Judge Palmer appropriately granted this

case upon motion by the State for failing to comply with the
court's order to comply with the discovery.
Likewise, Judge Dever appropriately interpreted Judge
Palmer's dismissal as "with prejudice."

However, Judge Dever

should have based the his conclusions based on the findings that
the Statefs motion to dismiss was voluntary, and by applying Rule
41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to Rule 81(e), Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, an order of attorney fees

would have been appropriate.

ARGUMENT
Preface.
As the Utah State Supreme Court has stated:
In Utah, the supreme court has, in addition to common
law power, constitutional authority to manage the
appellate process, Utah Const, art. V, § 1, art. VIII,
§§ 1, 4, as well as inherent supervisory authority over
all courts of this State. E.g., State v. Brown, 201
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner,
789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v.
James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 653 (Utah 1988); State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d
1076, 1081 (Utah 1985). Unless constrained by a
constitutional or statutory provision, we exercise our
powers to fashion standards of review that we think
best allocate responsibility between appellate and
trial courts in light of the particular determination
under review. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
the allocation of responsibility, or discretion,
between trial and appellate courts is a matter of
peculiar and close importance to the courts in
question, and we see no reason why our authority to
define standards of review should not extend to cases
where the determination under review is a question of
federal law.
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993).

The Thurman Court

went on to explain, in pertinent part:
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a
standard of review is to apportion power and,
consequently, responsibility between trial and
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of
issues. See, e.g., State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep.
35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36
(D.C. 1989); Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on
Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of
Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377 (1984); Ronald
R. Hofer, Standards of Review — Looking Beyond the
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter
Hofer]; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review,
6

85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35 (1985) [hereinafter
Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review
allocates discretion between trial and appellate
courts. In determining the appropriateness of a
particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of
the relative capabilities of each level of the court
system to take evidence and make findings of fact in
the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and
to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other.
See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15
(1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d
213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney,
728 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert,
denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis, 564 A.2d at 36-37.
In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of
the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor
is better positioned than another to decide the issue
in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222
(1991). See generally Hofer at 237-41.
Id.

In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed

Federal Law limiting the Court's power is free to govern itself
and rule of Utah matters free and clear of out-of-state
influences.
POINT I.
THE "DISMISSAL-WITH-PREJUDICE"
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The State argues in its Point I of Appellants Brief
that the dismissal in this case should be construed as a
dismissal without prejudice.

As a basis, the State relies on

Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Leigh, 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1996).
Dorman-Leigh is clearly distinguishable from the case at issue in
this matter.

The State fails to inform this Court of the pre-

trial conference held on September 29, 1995 which was continued
at the request of the Defendant so that the Defendant could view
the "video tape"* (see docket entry Appendix "C" of Appellant's
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Brief entry date of 09/29/95).

The pre-trial conference was

continued until October 23, 1995- (R. at 112). On October 23,
1995 at the pre-trial conference it was reported to the Court
that the video tape had not yet been made available to the
defense.

Judge Palmer then gave the State five more days in

which to produce the tape for the defense (see docket entry
Appendix "C" of Appellants Brief entry date of 10/23/95).

In

the same minute entry of October 23, 1995 the Court advises the
State that failure to produce the tape within said five days, the
case would be dismissed. Id.

Because the State was not going to

produce the tape within the specified five days the State filed a
preemptive "Motion to Dismiss", the sole purpose of which was to
outsmart the Judge and the system.

The State now complains about

the results of its own misdeeds.
In the first instance the State argues that the
Defendant did not attempt to mitigate his damages. THIS IS
CLEARLY INTENDED TO MISLEAD THIS COURT,
is not up on appeal.

The Defendant's conduct

The State1s attempt to misguide this Court

is comparable to the same attempt to outsmart the system below in
the trial court.

The Defendant did indeed attempt to mitigate

his damages below.

The Defendant requested a continuance in the

trial Court for the sole purpose of obtaining said discovery. (R.
at 112).

At the subsequent hearing the State was given a second

continuance to produce the tape.

Then prior to its deadline the

State "blinked!"—it threw in the towel and moved the Court for a
dismissal of the action so as to avoid trouble. (R. at 114-16.)
Once the prior matter was ordered dismissed, the State refiled
the action against Mr. Burningham.
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Based thereupon, Mr.

Burningham moved the trial court to dismiss this action—the
second action, which Judge Dever, correctly, granted.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 25 (hereinafter
"Rule 25") is NOT applicable in this case.

Rule 25 provides:

Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own
initiative or upon application of either party, order an
information or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment
when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in
bringing defendant to trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment,
together with any bill of particulars furnished in support
thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be
charged in the pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and
prejudicial defect in the impaneling or in the proceedings
relating to the grand jury;
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of
limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth
in an order and entered in the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there
was unreasonable delay, or the court is without
jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the
information or indictment, or there was a defect in the
impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury,
further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and
the court may make such orders with respect to the custody
of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant
shall be discharged and bail exonerated.
An order of
dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations,
shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the offense
charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor,
the court may dismiss the case if it is compromised by the
defendant and the injured party. The injured party shall
first acknowledge the compromise before the court or in
writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth
therein and entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense; provided
however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer
while in the performance of his duties, or riotously, or
with an intent to commit a felony.
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Id,

This rule does not apply to this case. The State

erroneously attempts to hide behind this provision.

This Rule 25

sets out the specific provisions to which it is applicable.

The

State sought and filed its own Motion to Dismiss, (R. at 114),
and now attempts to hide behind Rule 25 to justify it's erroneous
refiling of this action.

The case before Judge Palmer was not

dismissed pursuant to Rule 25 it was dismissed pursuant to

Rule

16(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 16"),
which states:
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it
is brought to the attention of the court that a party has
failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence
not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems
just under the circumstances.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16.
In this case, the trial court previously elected to
allow the inspection of the tape (the granting of the defendant's
request for a continuance on September 25, 1995).

(R. at 112).

The trial court then gave the prosecution a second chance. When
the prosecution was not going to comply therewith, the State
executed a preemptive strike to take the sting out of the trial
court's order.

(R. at 114).

Rule 16(g) allows the Court the

discretion to fashion remedies appropriate to the circumstances
and to each individual case.

The rule provides,

"or it may

enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances."
This case then is a case involving the discretion of
the trial court judge as provided in Rule 16(g) and not Rule 25.
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To allow the State to circumvent the sanctions intended by the
Court pursuant to a violation of Rule 16(g) would be to allow the
State to ignore the trial courtfs authority-

JUST DO A VOLUNTARY

DISMISSAL AFTER THE COURT ANNOUNCES IT'S INTENDED SANCTIONS THEN
REFILE AND YOU TAKE THE AUTHORITY AWAY FROM THE COURT!
This theory as espoused by the State flies in the face
of many of the well accepted legal theories, viz., res judicata,
judicial economy, forum shopping, judicial economy and finality
of judicial orders.

This Court should not condone preemptive

dismissals by a party with the intent of avoiding a trial court's
order and authority including sanctions.

Both Judge Dever and

Judge Palmer made correct decisions, well within their
discretion, and as such should be affirmed and the States appeal
should be dismissed.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED
THE DEFENDANT HIS ATTORNEYS FEES.
The State wants its cake and wants to eat it too.

It

didnft want the case dismissed before Judge Palmer; it wanted to
refile the case because it screwed up.

It wants this matter to

be controlled by Rule 25. The State wanted to beat the judge by
filing a voluntary dismissal before the imposition of Judge
Palmer's sanctions.

It wants to ignore Rule 16(g).

It believes

that the only sanction available to which Mr. Burningham is to
keep the tape from being used at the time of trial.

It wants

this Court to believe that the Defendant has not been prejudiced.
It does not claim any prejudice to itself.
The State's motion to dismiss was not by way of stipulation.
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This was an action which was taken by the State, on it's own.
Truly, the controlling provisions are not in the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, but rather the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 81(e) (hereinafter "Rule
81(e)") provides, as follows:
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules
shall apply to all special statutory proceedings,
except insofar as such rules are by their nature
clearly inapplicable. Where a statute provides for
procedure by reference to any part of the former
Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be
in accordance with these rules.
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall
not apply to proceedings in uncontested probate
and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all
proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue
therein, including the enforcement of any judgment
or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts.
These rules shall apply to civil actions commenced
in the city or justice courts, except insofar as
such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable to such courts or proceedings
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or
order of an administrative board or agency. These
rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in
appealing from or obtaining a review of any order,
ruling or other action of an administrative board
or agency, except insofar as the specific
statutory procedure in connection with any such
appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent
with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These
rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect
of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any
rule so applied does not conflict with any
statutory or constitutional requirement, (emphasis
added)
Id.

Subsection (e) provides that the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure apply to criminal matters at any time when they are not
in specific conflict with any other provision or are
unconstitutional.

The Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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(hereinafter "Rule 41") provides, as follows:
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by
the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing
a notice of dismissal at any time before service
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion
for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of the United States
or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon order of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall
not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply
with these rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or
of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in
an action tried by the court without a jury, has
completed the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted,
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If
the court renders judgment on the merits against
the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies/ a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
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venue or for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule
shall be made before a responsive pleading is
served or, if there is none, before the
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any
court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the
court may make such order for the payment of costs
of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action
until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse
party. Should a party dismiss his complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a
provisional remedy has been allowed such party,
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such
provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by
the court to the adverse party against whom such
provisional remedy was obtained. (emphasis added)
Id.

In the current case, the dismissal of the action against Mr.

Burningham was by the Plaintiff's ex parte Motion to Dismiss.
(R. at 114)• Accordingly, based on the given facts of this case
Rule 41 is not in conflict with the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and should be the basis for the dismissal with prejudice.
In the Order prepared by the Plaintiff there is no
reference to the dismissal being without prejudice.

(R. at 115).

This would mean that the dismissal was with prejudice and on the
merits.

Understanding that the matter has been dismissed on the

merits it is inappropriate that this matter be refiled.
of the case is that the case has been dismissed.

The law

Mr. Burningham

is entitled to the application of res judicata, or double
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jeopardy or both.

If the State is free to refile then at a

minimum the threat of Judge Palmer to dismiss for failure to
comply with discovery orders is hollow and without substance.
Further the provisions under Rule 41 provide that the
party refiling an action after previous dismissal should pay the
costs of the prior case for the opposing party.

This would be

appropriate if indeed the Court permits this matter to go
forward.

In the alternative, if this Honorable Court agrees with

Mr. Burningham then sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are in order and those sanctions should be
commensurate with the cost to Mr. Burningham of the second case.
Certainly, Mr. Burningham should be entitled to his attorney fees
for both cases filed—the voluntarily dismissed case and the
refiled case and for violating Rule 11—Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure—sanctions as well.

Further, the Defendant should be

awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal.

This case should be

remanded for determination of appropriate attorney fees and
costs.

CONCLUSION
Therefore, in light of the foregoing reasons, it is
requested that this Honorable Court find no error in the trial
courts decisions to dismiss, including the dismissal-with
prejudice.

The Appellee and Cross-Appellant further requests

this Honorable Court to find that the dismissal-with-prejudice
was appropriate under Rule 41 as it was not in conflict with any
other criminal rules pursuant to Rule 81(e).
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Therefore, the Appellee and Cross-Appellant further
requests for this Court to affirm the trial court's decisions to
dismiss and remand this matter to the trial court to determine
attorney fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

12th

day of

April, 1997.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Appellant
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ADDENDA

I.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or
in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
January 1, 1995

II.

Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a)
court
order
(b)

In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party,
an information or indictment dismissed.
The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any
bill of particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury;
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and
entered in the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the
offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect
to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged
and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to
any other prosecution for the offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party.
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony.
Cross-References. — Detainers against
prisoners, dismissal of action for failure to
bring to trial, § 77-29-1.
Dismissal not a bar to further proceedings,
§ 77-1-7.

Dismissal where evidence not sufficient to
establish offense charged, U.R.Cr.P. 17.
Right to speedy trial, Utah ConBt., Art. I,
Sec 12- § 77-1-6

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any .other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court t h a t a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings,
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable
intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the
time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.

IV.

PART XL
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general.
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance
with these rules.
(b) P r o b a t e and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement
of any judgment or order entered.
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings
therein.
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules.
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict
with any statutory or constitutional requirement.

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; b y stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at
the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
(e) Bond or u n d e r t a k i n g to be delivered to adverse party. Should a
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d)
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule
41, F.R.C.P.

VI.

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers;
sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)

